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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Immunity From Prosecution Automatically Re-
sults When A Witness Is Compelled To Give
Testimony Before A Grand Jury-Petitioner, a
public official, was called as a witness before a spe-
cial grand jury investigating corruption in the
county government. Under the appropriate stat-
ute, immunity from prosecution must be requested
and §pecifically conferred before incriminating
testimony may be compelled from a witness. Peti-
tioner freely testified without a specific grant of
immunity and was subsequently indicted as a re-
sult of his testimony. He moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination was violated.
The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the
lower court's dismissal, holding that the New York
statute could not place the burden of claiming the
privilege upon the witness when his testimony is
compelled by the grand jury. The protection from
prosecution resulting from the use of incriminating
testimony given by a witness before the grand jury
arises automatically when the witness is com-
pelled to testify. People v. Steuding, 160 N.E. 2d
468 (N.Y. 1959).
The dissent insisted that the privilege against
self-incrimination is one personal to the witness
and may be waived. The subpoena and subsequent
oath did not compel incriminating testimony, but if
defendant gave such testimony after being ap-
prised of his rights, then he is deemed to have
waived his privilege and to have testified freely.
"There is not the slightest warrant of law for saying
that in the absence of statute any one may be quit
of his crimes by testifying before a grand jury. A
man has a right to stand mute, if he will, but if he
speaks he does not by that purge himself of his
crime."
In Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), a similar
problem was presented. Petitioners were convicted
of contempt of a legislative commission which
was investigating subversive activities. Petitioners
refused to answer certain questions put to them,
after being advised of their privilege against self-
incrimination. Their conviction for contempt was
based upon a state statute which automatically
granted immunity from prosecution to anyone
who testified before a legislative commission.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the inexplicably contradictory commands
made by the statute and the legislative commission
should be judicially denied the force of criminal
sanctions. Affirmance "would be to sanction the
most indefensible sort of entrapment by. the
State-convicting a citizen for exercising a privi-
lege which the State dearly had told him was
available to him."
Ordinance Creating a Presumption of Guilt
When a Person Is Found in Place Where Nar-
cotics Are Unlawfully Kept Held Unconstitu-
tional-Defendant was convicted of violating a
Seattle municipal ordinance making it unlawful
for anyone to be found in any place where nar-
cotics are unlawfully kept. Upon appeal defendant
contended that the ordinance was an invalid exer-
cise of the police power since it made unlawful
the performance of "innocent acts which are unre-
lated in any way to the narcotic traffic and the
punishment of which could not conceivably tend
to discourage that traffic." The Supreme Court of
Washington, agreeing with defendant's conten-
tion, held that the ordinance was an unreasonable
extension of the city's police power. City of Seattle v.
Ross, 344 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1959).
The defendant viewed the ordinance as creating
an irrebutable presumption that any person found
in proximity to unlawfully kept drugs, and not
carrying with him some official authorization, was
guilty of participating in the narcotics traffic. The
court concluded that "in a place where narcotics
are illegally kept, used, or disposed of there is no
physical characteristic which would serve to
warn an innocent person of the presence of such
narcotics." Thus the statutory presumption could
not be sustained since there was "no rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed."
Evidence of Established Character May Alone
Generate Reasonable Doubt of Guilt-Petitioner
was convicted of the robbery of an employee of a
federally insured bank. The trial court failed to
instruct the jury that proof of defendant's es-
tablished reputation for good character may alone
generate a reasonable doubt of his guilt, although
without such proof other evidence of guilt might
be convincing. The United States Court of Ap-
peals reversed the conviction, holding that the
failure of the trial court to give the requested in-
struction was prejudicial error. Johnson v. United
States, 269 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 50
